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Of Rainbows and Rivers: Lessons for
Telecommunications Spectrum Policy from
Transitions in Property Rights and Commons
in Water Law
DALE B. THOMPSONt

Some of our most important new technologies involve
the use of the telecommunications spectrum. Cellular
telephones, wireless internet service, cordless telephones,
baby monitors: these all use some portion of the telecommunications spectrum to provide billions of dollars of
services.
Until recently, interest in the telecommunications
spectrum was confined primarily to television and radio
broadcasts, ham radio operators, and military and public
service (police, fire, and ambulance) uses. With these
limited uses, the United States chose to allocate the telecommunications spectrum through decisions of a regulatory
agency, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
While many criticized this allocation system,' it nonetheless
continued to be used up until the late 1990s.
With the development of recent technologies, many,
including the FCC itself, realized that another approach
was necessary. In response, the FCC auctioned off a portion
t As of Fall 2006, Department of Ethics and Business Law, College of Business,
University of St. Thomas; Saint Cloud State University Department of
Economics; J.D. 1998, Stanford Law School; Ph.D. (Economics) 1998, Stanford
University. I would like to thank Susan Snyder, Peter Oh, Richard Murphy,
Shi-Ling Hsu, Jay Weiser, Mark Kanazawa, Henry E. Smith, and the
participants at seminar presentations at the Canadian Law & Economics
Association 2004 Conference; at William Mitchell College of Law; and at the
Midwestern Law & Economics Association 2005 Annual Meeting for extremely
helpful comments on this article. Erik Hammarlund provided superb research
assistance.
1. See, e.g., Ronal

H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2

J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1959).
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of unallocated spectrum. 2 Auctions conducted between 1994
and 1996 raised revenues of approximately $20 billion. 3 A
rationale for these auctions was to increase the
development of new technologies that utilize the telecommunications spectrum, by opening up new frequencies to
new uses. The revenue generated indicates how valuable
these technologies are expected to be. However, despite the
availability of these new frequencies, many believed that
these auctions were insufficient to meet the rising demand.
This demand for new frequencies was both caused by recent
innovations and needed for additional technological
progress. One technology writer noted that technological
development utilizing the spectrum has not progressed as
fast in the United States as in other parts of the world:
"[U.S.] policies . . . have . . . allowed Asia--Japan in
particular-to not only catch up in the development and
expansion of broadband and mobile
phone technology, but
4
to roundly pound us into the dirt."
As a result, a new debate has raged over spectrum. To
improve technological development, many have recommended significant changes in allocating spectrum, some
based on a "property rights"
approach, and others based on
5
a "commons" approach.
This Article takes a novel approach to this problem, by
applying lessons from our two-hundred-year history of
water law to spectrum policy. Also, instead of analyzing
static characteristics of property systems, this Article
changes its focus to examine transitions in these systems.
2. See John McMillan, Selling Spectrum Rights, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 145
(1994); Teresa Riordan, FCC's Auction Draws Rich Bids, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,
1994, at D1,cited in Dean Lueck, The Rule of FirstPossession and the Design of
the Law, 38 J.L. & ECON. 393, 421 (1995).
3. See Peter Cramton, The Efficiency of the FCC Spectrum Auctions, 41 J.L.
& ECON. 727 (1998).

4. Dan Mitchell, A BroadbandBeat-Down, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2005, at C1.
This article goes on to state, "Japan, South Korea and other Asian countries are
poised to leap ahead of the United States in any number of areas:
teleconferencing, telecommuting, remote medical services, distance education,
multimedia entertainment." Id.
5. For more, see infra Part III. Also, a recent article examines the structure
of telecommunications regulation under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as
a "semicommons," involving components of both property rights and commons.
See Henry E. Smith, Governing the Tele-Semicommons, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 289
(2005).
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Based on a new classification of property, "marketable
commons property, '"6 this Article presents a solution to the
allocation of spectrum: spectrum commons accounts (SCA).
This novel approach is closely related to the "Property
Rights versus Commons" debate over spectrum. 7 Some
favor a "property rights" approach, whereby spectrum is put
to its highest valued purposes by permitting those who
value spectrum the highest to purchase the right to use a
portion of the spectrum from the "owner" of the property
right to that portion. This approach works well for spectrum
technologies, such as financial market transaction technologies, that suffer significant losses if they are interfered
with. The property rights approach addresses this by
limiting the use of a specific frequency to only the owner of
that frequency.
Others instead favor a "commons" approach, whereby a
specific portion of spectrum is shared by a number of users
in such a manner as to permit most if not all of these users
to achieve their purposes for use of spectrum. This approach
works well for spectrum technologies that depend on a
multitude of inventors designing different applications that
are less susceptible to interference problems, but that also
have little financing necessary to purchase the exclusive
right to utilize a frequency. One example has been the rapid
advance in technology for wireless computer networks,
where a number of different inventors have developed
different applications for wireless networks, all utilizing the
same frequency.
In the end, this debate is all about the encouragement
of technological development. Commons advocates believe
that the commons approach is the way to achieve
technological change, while property rights advocates
believe that the protection of exclusive property rights is
needed to properly advance technology. This is an
6. See infra Table 1 and Part I.

7. The structure of this debate is similar to other "commons versus property
rights" debates over file-sharing technologies, the internet, and the copyright
extension act. For instance, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE
FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001). See also Brett M.
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructureand Commons Management,
89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005) (linking analysis of infrastructure resources with

the commons approach and identifying characteristics that lead to improved
management through a commons approach).
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important question whose answer provides a link to a
multi-billion dollar market. Answering this question also
involves better understanding the process of technological
8
development, along with the role of risk and uncertainty.
Until now, this debate has missed an important
consideration: the ability of a property system to adapt to
changes. The choice between a commons approach or a
property rights approach is in essence the selection of a
system for managing telecommunications spectrum as
property. One thing that has been clear over the history of
property law is the need for a property system to adapt to
changed circumstances. Our analysis of future interests has
led to modifications of the application of a number of rules
that have perplexed lawyers for hundreds of years. For
instance, in most jurisdictions, the infamous Rule in
Shelley's Case no longer applies. 9 Also, copyright law has
adapted from its initial application to works reproduced by
printing presses, to works reproducible by photocopying
machines, and now to digital media. Consequently, the
desirability of a particular property system may depend
heavily on its ability to adapt to new circumstances.
One of the reasons for this lack of attention is the
inherent difficulty of analyzing a property system's
adaptability before the fact: how can you know how a
commons system will adapt to changed circumstances if you
do not know what these new circumstances will be? While
we cannot see into the future, we can examine the past.
Although there is a very limited history of commons and
property rights for the telecommunications spectrum, there
are other property resources with a lengthy history of
allocating that resource through both a commons approach
and a property rights approach.
One such resource, water, shares many characteristics
with the telecommunications spectrum. While we have had
very limited experience with commons and property rights
approaches for spectrum, we have had approximately two
hundred years of experience with these approaches for
water rights. The similarities between spectrum and water
suggest that we can make predictions about the future
adaptability of property systems for the telecommunications
8. For more, see infra Part VI.C.
9. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 300 (5th ed. 2002).
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spectrum by analyzing our past experiences with water
rights.10

This Article examines our experiences with using
commons and property rights approaches to allocate water
resources. In the United States, water law doctrine is split
into two approaches: "riparian" (utilized primarily in
Eastern states) and "prior appropriations" (utilized
primarily in Western states). This Article explains how
riparian doctrine for water rights is essentially a commons
approach, while the prior appropriations doctrine is a
property rights approach. It then examines significant
lessons from our approximately two-hundred-year history of
water rights and applies these lessons to telecommunications spectrum.
To facilitate analysis, this Article presents a new
classification for property. In an earlier article, Carol Rose
suggested a third classification for property, "inherently
public property," in addition to commons and property
rights classifications."
Inherently public property is
essentially property that is held by private individuals with
an option to convert the private property into a commons
held by the government. 12 For instance, real property is
subject to the power of eminent domain, whereby the
government can convert property formerly held as private
property into property held as commons (for use by the
government for the good of the public). This Article extends
Rose's framework to include a new classification,
"marketable commons property." Marketable commons
property is essentially property that is held as a commons,
but with an option to convert it into property held
privately.' 3 This option essentially "completes the square"
as a fourth option:
10. Lueck, supra note 2, examines first possession doctrine under both
water law and telecommunications spectrum, in addition to first possession of
chattels, homesteading, adverse possession, mining, and intellectual property.
However, his examination of spectrum focuses primarily on the early history of
spectrum allocation (1920-1927), with some discussion of the recent auctions.
Id. at 419.
11. See generally Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 711 (1986).

12. See id. at 720-21, 749.
13. For more on options, see Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118
HARv. L. REV. 1399 (2005).
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Table 1: Classifications of Property

No Option
Held
Inherent
Option Held

Primary
Owner: Private

Primary
Owner: Public

Property Rights

Commons

Inherently Public

Marketable
Commons

The lessons from water law suggest that internal
contradictions within a property rights approach to
spectrum may lead to transitions in the form of this
property system to one that is not envisioned by current
advocates of the property rights approach. In a similar
manner, external forces may change a commons property
system for spectrum into one that current advocates of this
approach have not envisioned. What is needed is a
mechanism that responds well to transitions.
More recent developments in water law suggest an
alternative property structure for spectrum to manage both
these internal contradictions and external forces. This
Article labels this structure a "spectrum commons account"
(SCA), and it is a form of marketable commons property.
With an SCA, frequencies are available for use as a
commons. When certain conditions are met, there remains
an option to convert a particular frequency into one held as
private property.
The advantage of an SCA is that initially, it enables
significant innovation by a multitude of inventors, because
the frequency is available as a commons. Moreover, if one of
these technologies becomes very valuable but is susceptible
to problems with interference that can affect a commons
frequency, there remains an option to convert the commons
frequency into private property. Consequently, an SCA
achieves the best of both worlds: it enables large-scale
innovation as under a commons, but it also enables
development of technologies that are extremely valuable
but susceptible to interference, as would occur under a
property rights approach.
After this introduction, the Article begins with some
foundational material on property classifications. It then
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presents some background on the technological aspects of
spectrum, including our recent experiences. Following this,
the Article reviews the commons versus property rights
debate for spectrum. 14 Next, it briefly describes the riparian
and prior appropriations doctrines for water law. It then
discusses the strong similarities between water resources
and spectrum, between a commons approach and riparian
doctrine, and between a property approach and prior
appropriations doctrine. Drawing on these, it concludes by
developing lessons for spectrum by analyzing our history
with water law. In so doing, this Article presents a novel
approach to designing a property system for the telecommunication spectrum that provides strong incentives to
innovate extremely valuable new technologies under a wide
range of circumstances.
I. CLASSIFICATIONS FOR PROPERTY, AND A NEW
CLASSIFICATION: "MARKETABLE COMMONS PROPERTY"

In many analyses, property can be classified under
either a commons approach or a property rights approach.
Under a commons approach, property is held by the public
and all have the right to utilize that property. Under a
property rights approach, property is held by a limited set
of individuals, and an essential component of the property
right is the right to exclude others from the use of that
14. In this literature, many advocates of these approaches do not advocate
completely one-sided approaches to spectrum. For instance, as discussed further
below, property rights advocates sometimes suggest schemes that are
predominately property-rights-based, but include minor "commons"-based
components. And commons advocates sometimes suggest that initially, only an
additional small portion of the spectrum should be allocated as commons. See
Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 25, 33 (2002) ("As a policy recommendation, it is too early to adopt a Big
Bang approach to spectrum policy--either in favor of property or in favor of a
commons. From a purely economic perspective, it would be sensible for current
policy to experiment with both."). In this article, rather than considering
transitions involving these more complex schemes, I will instead consider
transitions involving systems based solely on the commons approach, or based
solely on the property rights approach. This is necessary because the responses
to transitional forces by these more complex systems depend on the details of
their implementation, and at this point, the details of these recommended
mixed-approach systems are insufficiently developed. On the other hand, we
can develop predictions regarding how systems based completely on one of the
approaches will respond to these transitional forces, and so that is what I do in
this Article.

164

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

property. 15 These diametrically opposed approaches have
generated a number of debates. For instance, there is a
significant debate over whether future development of the
Internet should be classified under a commons approach or
under a property rights approach. 16 Recently, this debate
has also played out in our analysis of copyright. This debate
underlies the arguments of the two sides in Eldred v.
Ashcroft' 7 about the Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998.18 It has also played a significant role in the cases
about file-sharing technologies, Napster and Grokster. 19
In The Comedy of the Commons, Carol Rose noted that
there were certain types of property that did not fit within
20
the classifications of either property rights or commons.
For instance, while water rights are typically held by
private individuals, these rights are limited by "public
trust" rights that are held by the public. 2 ' Also, while
copyrights are held by individuals, these rights are also
limited by the "fair use" doctrine. 22 Real estate rights are
similarly limited by the eminent domain right held by the
government. Rose suggested that these property regimes
did not fit neatly into either "commons" or "property rights"
classifications. Instead, Rose suggested a new category:
"inherently public property. '23 Inherently public property is
property that is primarily held by individuals with certain
rights reserved to the public.

15. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433
(1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
16. See LESSIG, supra note 7.
17. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2005).
19. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); MGM
Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. & StreamCast Networks Inc., No. 04-480, 2005 WL
1499402 (U.S. June 27, 2005).
20. See generally Rose, supra note 11.
21. For more on "public trust," see infra Part V.A.
22. Fair use is a defense to copyright liability that arises generally for uses
that are of a non-profit nature, utilize a less substantial portion of the original
work, and have limited impact on the market for the original work. See Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
23. See generally Rose, supra note 11.
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This Article takes her concept and twists it to suggest
another classification for property: "marketable commons
property." Marketable commons property is property that is
primarily held as commons, with certain rights reserved to
individuals. In the case of an SCA, there will exist an option
so that under certain circumstances, an individual user of a
commons frequency might convert that particular frequency
into excludable property. This instance of marketable
commons property forms the basis of this Article's recommendations for telecommunications spectrum policy.
II. THE TECHNOLOGY OF SPECTRUM, AND OUR EXPERIENCE
WITH UNLICENSED USE

What is the telecommunications spectrum? The
spectrum refers to a collection of frequencies for conducting
telecommunications. Telecommunications occur when a
radio wave is sent from a transmitter to a receiver. Radio
waves themselves are forms of electromagnetic radiation.
When they are generated, these waves oscillate at certain
frequencies. The telecommunications spectrum then is the
collection of frequencies used for telecommunications, which
is currently approximately three kilohertz (3 kHz, or 3000
cycles per second) to three hundred
gigahertz (300 GHz, or
24
300 billion cycles per second).
Guglielmo Marconi discovered that a signal generated
by a transmitter at a specific frequency could be captured
by a receiver tuned to the same frequency as the
transmitter. 25 This enabled the separation of signals by
putting them on different frequencies. 26 However, this
ability to receive the signal is sometimes compromised by
interference. Interference occurs when a receiver cannot
identify the source transmission due to receiving other
transmissions generated at the same or close frequencies.

24. See NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, UNITED
STATES FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS: THE RADIO SPECTRUM (2003), http://www.ntia.
doc.gov/osmhome/allochrt.pdf.
25. See The 7777 Wireless Patent, http://www.sparkmuseum.com/BOOK
_MARCONI.HTM (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
26. See Sold-Marconi Thanks the Newfoundland Government for Making
Possible His Discovery, http://www.raabcollection.com/detail.aspx?cat=6&sub
cat=140&man=213 (last visited Feb. 8, 2006).
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New developments in telecommunications have offered
opportunities to combat interference. One is the use of
spread-spectrum techniques. Developed initially during
World War II for "jamming resistance," 27 spread-spectrum
utilizes signals sent over a wide range of frequencies but
with lower power. The likelihood of interfering with other
transmissions is reduced as power is reduced. Other new
technologies for reducing the likelihood of 28interference
include smart antennas and repeater networks.
In addition to innovation in the technology behind
telecommunications, we have also had innovations in the
management of the spectrum. One important innovation is
the opening of certain parts of the spectrum (such as 900
MHz, 2.4 GHz, and 5 GHz) to unlicensed use. Because use
is unlicensed in these frequencies, they essentially operate
as a commons. 29 The core of the commons versus property
rights debate for the telecommunication spectrum derives
from our current experience with the telecommunication
spectrum.
At these unlicensed frequencies, all members of the
public have the right to broadcast and receive transmissions, along with the right to design and sell equipment
that broadcasts and receives transmissions. With free
access, this enables inventors of new technologies the
opportunity to develop their technologies knowing not only
that they will have the right to sell equipment that utilizes
these frequencies, but also that the potential consumers of
their equipment will also have the right to use this
equipment to broadcast and receive transmissions.
27. BERNARD SKLAR, DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS 719 (2d ed. 2001).
28. David P. Reed, How Wireless Networks Scale: The Illusion of Spectrum
Scarcity, Presentation to the FCC Technological Advisory Council (Apr. 26,
2002), http://www.reed.com/OpenSpectrum/Spectrum%20capacity%20myth%20
FCC%20TAC.ppt, cited in Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified
Theory of Wireless Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863, 888 n.126 (2004).
29. With these frequencies already marked as commons, the current debate
can be understood as a choice between whether to extend additional frequencies
to commons, or whether to operate them as property rights. Taken to its
extreme, the commons argument that technology could solve interference
problems would suggest that (with the exception of whether certain
frequencies-in particular the "beachfront property" currently used by
television broadcast-that have considerably greater desirability than 900 MHz
and 2.4 GHz) the current availability of these frequencies as commons should
be sufficient, which is clearly not the intent of commons advocates.
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These opportunities have led to significant innovations,
in a wide array of applications. Consider the 2.4 GHz band.
Microwave ovens used this frequency, and developed ways
to more effectively heat food.30 Makers of cordless phones
initially used frequencies around 50 MHz, and then began
using 900 MHz to provide better quality and range.3 1 To
further improve range and reduce interference from 900
MHz baby monitors,3 2 cordless phone manufacturers began
using the 2.4 GHz range also. Completely new technologies
also developed that utilized this spectrum. One was
Bluetooth, for which one of the applications enables cell
phone users to receive calls to their cell phone on their
automobiles' telephone system, which is presumed to be
safer than holding the cell phone while driving.33 Another
significant innovation using the 2.4 GHz range was the
IEEE 802.1lb and 802.11g standards for wireless local area
networks.3 4 These standards enabled manufacturers to
develop very inexpensive equipment for operating wireless
networks, and have been adopted by many businesses and
many residential users also.3 5 Advocates of the commons
approach make a strong argument that this experience with
unlicensed spectrum suggests that the commons approach
is a better way to encourage innovation.3 6
Nonetheless, this experience with unlicensed spectrum
also provides evidence in support of the property rights
approach. The wide range of applications and users of
equipment have led to significant problems with interference. For instance, say Alice is using a 2.4 GHz cordless
phone to talk with her brother, Bob. While Alice is talking,
her son, Carl, starts cooking popcorn in their microwave
oven. As a result, although unable to directly hear the

30. 35th Annual Microwave Symposium, 21 MICROWAVE WORLD 1 (2000),
availableat http://www.impi.org/publications/microwaveworld/MicrowaveWorld.pdf.
31. Marshall Brain, How the Radio Spectrum Works (1998), http://electronics.

howstuffworks.com/radio-spectrum.htm.
32. Id.
33. See Bluetooth Basics, http://www.bluetooth.com/Bluetooth/Learn/Basics
(last visited March 29, 2006).
34. GLOBAL INTERNET POLICY INITIATIVE, REGULATORY TREATMENT OF 802.11B
SERVICES (2002), http://www.internetpolicy.net/practices/80211b.pdf.
35. See id.

36. See, e.g., Werbach, supranote 28, at 879.
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sound of popcorn popping, Alice and Bob instead may now
hear significant static on both of their phones; and they
may have to wait until the popcorn is finished to resume
their conversation. This is because Alice's cordless phone
handset is receiving signals not only from the cordless
phone base, but also from the microwave oven (which tends
to emit a strong pulse).
Microwaves and cordless phones may also interfere
with wireless networks. This can be significantly problematic because of security concerns. For instance, Michael has
set up a wireless network at his residence to provide
maximum security for communications between his laptop
and his wireless router. Due to interference, his secure
connection is lost. Unnoticed by Michael, however, another
nearby wireless network (perhaps his neighbor's) is
available, and so his laptop automatically switches over to
it. However, this connection is now not secure, because
otherwise he would not have been able to connect to it.
Consequently, although Michael had assumed that the
financial transactions he was performing on his laptop were
conducted through his secure wireless network, instead
they are now broadcast over an unsecured network, and all
of his data is susceptible to interception.
The successful innovation in this spectrum has greatly
increased the potential for interference. As noted in a
microwave oven industry research paper, "Never before
have we had the potential for hundreds of millions of
microwave devices interfereing [sic] with hundreds of
millions of communications devices. The potential for
consumer dissatisfaction and complaints could become
exceedingly costly for both the microwave and communications industries." 37 Even very sophisticated equipment is
susceptible to these interference problems. 38 As a result,

37. See 35th Annual Microwave Symposium, supra note 30, at 31.
38. Here is an anecdote from wireless professionals:
I was personally a witness to a wireless 2.4 GHz data circuit trial, the
$40,000 non-WiFi gear designed to be a T1/1.5 Mbps replacement at
distances of a couple of miles. The distance for this particular
installation was less than three blocks, call it under 300 feet, clear lineof-site between the two antennas. Most of the time, it worked fine, but
the link would intermittently cut out in the mornings, afternoon, and
evenings. After a week or two, the downtimes were mapped to the up
times of the one site's microwave oven, a sturdy early '90s model.
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advocates of the property rights approach will point to
interference possibilities to oppose extending additional
spectrum to commons.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS VERSUS
COMMONS DEBATE

The primary approach for managing the telecommunications spectrum in the United States currently is
through governmental control over licensing. Governmental
control arose out of the Radio Act of 1927,39 which arose in
response to problems with interference caused by the
competing stations in the new broadcast industry. 40 This
legislation was updated by the Communications Act of
1934,41 which established the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC). Under this regime, the FCC "assigns"
frequencies to licensees, 42 who must then operate under
certain technological and other regulations to prevent
interference. 43 Licensees are not allowed to sell their
licenses without FCC approval. 44 This approach
dominated
the management of spectrum until the 1990s. 45
This approach came under attack by those who
suggested that property rights would be a better way to
manage the spectrum. First proposed in an initially little
noticed law review article by Leo Herzel in 1951,46 this idea
was then famously expounded by Ronald Coase in the
article, The Federal Communications Commission, which

Needless to say, the gear got dumped and replaced with a glorified DSL
connection.
Doug Mohney, The cons and pros of 2.4 GHz wireless connections, THE
INQUIRER, Jan. 16, 2003, http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=7235.
39. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).
40. Coase, supra note 1, at 1-6.

41. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615b (2000)).
42. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2005).
43. Werbach, supra note 28, at 875.
44. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3540(a) (2004).
45. See Werbach, supra note 28, at 870-73.
46. Leo Herzel, Comment, "Public Interest" and the Market in Color
Television Regulation, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 802 (1951).
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appeared in the Journal of Law and Economics in 1959. 4 7
In this article, Coase argued that, just as with other
resources, the pricing system and private property are
48
significantly better ways to allocate spectrum frequencies.
Thirty-five years later, the FCC finally began to follow this
recommendation when4 9 it auctioned a number of frequencies
off from 1994 to 1996.
However, to many, the FCC had not gone far enough in
following a property rights approach to spectrum. In 1996, a
conference called The Law and Economics of Property
Rights to Radio Spectrum was held, with many of the
presenters advocating the extension of additional frequencies to management by property rights. 50 The organizer of
this conference, Thomas Hazlett, later published another
article in which he more forcefully argued for the adoption
of the property rights mechanism to manage
the telecom53
munications spectrum. 51 Lawrence White 52 and others
also published articles calling for the use of the property
rights approach for managing the entire telecommunications spectrum.
At this same 1996 conference, however, another
presenter, Eli Noam, called for a different approach to
replacing government control over the spectrum. 54 Drawing

47. Coase, supra note 1.
48. See id.
49. See generally Peter C. Cramton, The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early
Assessment, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 431 (1997).
50. Proceedings of this conference were published in a special issue of the
Journal of Law and Economics, 41 J.L. & ECON. 521 (1998).
51. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth
Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's
'Big Joke": An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 335
(2001).
52. Lawrence J. White, "Propertyzing"the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why
It's Important, and How to Begin, 9 MEDIA L. & POLY 19 (2000), available at
http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/archive/White-article.pdf.
53. See, e.g., Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights
Approach to CommunicationsSpectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 82 (1999).
54. See Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday's Heresy, Today's
Orthodoxy, Tomorrow's Anachronism. Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum
Access, 41 J.L. & ECON. 765 (1998).
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56
on earlier suggestions by George Gilder 55 and Paul Baran,
Noam advocated the application of a commons mechanism
for managing spectrum. 57 Specifically, Noam recommended
an open access system for spectrum in which "nobody would
control any particular frequency," and instead access would
be granted to anyone paying a non-discriminatory access
fee. 58 Yochai Benkler followed Noam with a number of
articles offering arguments for the superiority of a commons
approach to the property rights approach. 59 In particular,
Benkler pointed to the new technologies of spreadspectrum, smart receivers, and repeater networks that
meant that spectrum
was no longer "an independent and
60
finite resource."
Additionally, drawing upon analogies to management of
the internet, Lawrence Lessig in The Future of Ideas also
began advocating the use of a commons approach to
manage more of the telecommunication spectrum.6 1 Kevin
Werbach has extended this approach to what he calls a
"Supercommons," in which management of telecommunications is not based on property principles but instead on
reciprocal tort principles.6 2 Similar to Benkler, Werbach

55. George Gilder, The New Rule of Wireless, FORBES ASAP, Mar. 29, 1993,
at 96.
56. Paul Baran, Visions of the 21st Century Communications: Is the
Shortage of Radio Spectrum for Broadband Networks of the Future a Self Made
Problem?, Keynote Address at the 8th Annual Conference on Next Generation
Networks (Nov. 9, 1994), available at http://www.eff.org/Infrastructure/
Wirelesscellular radio/falsescarcity baran-cngn94.transcript.
57. See Noam, supra note 54. For a critique of Noam's recommendation, see
Thomas Hazlett, Spectrum Flash Dance: Eli Noam's Proposal for 'Open Access'
to Radio Waves, 41 J.L. & ECON. 805 (1998).
58. Noam, supra note 54, at 777. The access fee would fluctuate depending
on congestion, but would not be different from one user to another.
59. See Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia:Building the Commons of
the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287 (1998); Yochai
Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561 (2000);
Benkler, supra note 14.
60. Benkler, supra note 14, at 23.
61. LESSIG, supra note 7, does advocate a mixed approach of property and
commons for spectrum.
62. Werbach, supra note 28.
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emphasizes the ability of new technologies
to "avoid
63
[interference] conflicts dynamically."
There is an implication that due to technology, we may
no longer face a shortage of spectrum. Property rights
advocates strongly objected to this implication. Hazlett
argued that even though new developments can increase
capacity of the telecommunications system, additional
transmissions eventually lead to degradation. 64 Hazlett
then pointed to Say's law (supply creates its own demand) 65
to demonstrate that the increased capacity would lead to
the additional
transmissions that would cause signal
66
degradation.
Property rights and commons advocates again faced off
at a conference held in 2003 at Stanford Law School,
organized jointly by Lawrence Lessig and Thomas
Hazlett. 67 At this conference, among other papers, a paper
by a former chief economist and a former chief technologist
of the FCC, Gerald Faulhaber and David Farber,
68
synthesized the property rights and commons approaches.
One recommendation involved the use of public "parks" of
spectrum frequencies within a system of otherwise private
property controlled frequencies.6 9 These parks would then
operate as a commons with open access. 70 Another
recommendation was the creation of a property rights
regime combined with what they called a "noninterference
easement. '71 The noninterference easement would allow
open access to spectrum frequencies as long as those openaccess uses did not interfere with the uses operated by the
63. Id. at 902.
64. Hazlett, supranote 51, at 488.
65. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 851 (5th ed. 1991).
66. Hazlett, supra note 51, at 489.
67. Spectrum Policy: Property or Commons?, Conference Proceedings at
Stanford Law School (Mar. 1 & 2, 2003), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/ spectrum.
68. Gerald R. Faulhaber & David Farber, Spectrum Management: Property
Rights, Markets, and the Commons, in RETHINKING RIGHTS AND REGULATIONS:
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO NEW COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES 193 (Lorrie

Faith Cranor & Steven S. Wildman eds., 2003).
69. See id. at 213.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 208-09.
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holder of the property right for that frequency. 72 Despite
these attempts to find a compromise, the debate continues.
Furthermore, a debate within the property rights
versus commons debate concerns the applicability of
treating the telecommunications spectrum as a natural
resource. This debate stretches back to Coase's article, in
which Coase made the argument that as a resource,
spectrum should be allocated by markets. 73 In this article,
74
Coase also made an analogy between land and spectrum.
However, in the same article, Coase also emphasizes that
the relevant property right to spectrum is a usufructuary
right, not a right to materially own the resource: "What
does not seem to have been understood is that what is being
allocated by the Federal Communications Commission ...
is the right to use a piece of equipment to transmit signals
in a particular way." 75 Some have interpreted this passage
to imply that Coase "stated
quite clearly that spectrum was
' 76
not a physical resource.
Following Coase, Harvey Levin in The Radio Spectrum
Resource argued strongly that proper management of
spectrum required a better understanding of its nature as a
resource. 77 Christian Herter also made the case that
spectrum was a natural resource. 78 He concluded that
because spectrum was a "scarce" and "limited" natural
resource, "equitable and careful management . . . is
crucial." 79 Even a commons advocate, Stuart Buck, argues

72. See id.
73. See Coase, supra note 1.

74. Coase used the land analogy to explain the problem of interference.
Coase, supra note 1, at 25.
75. Id. at 33. For more discussion of Coase's view of "use rights," see Thomas
W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 371-74 (2001).

76. Werbach, supranote 28, at 884 n.110.
77. Harvey Levin, The Radio Spectrum Resource, 11 J.L. & ECON. 433
(1968). Levin followed this article with a book examining the management of
spectrum as a resource. HARVEY J. LEVIN, THE INVISIBLE RESOURCE: USE AND
REGULATION OF THE RADIO SPECTRUM (1971).

78. Christian A. Herter, Jr., The Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Critical
NaturalResource, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 651 (1985).

79. Id. at 663.
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and "land and other
that the analogy between spectrum
80
[common pool] resources" is strong.
However, recently, the applicability of the analogy
between spectrum and natural resources has come under
direct attack.8 1 In Supercommons, Kevin Werbach bluntly
proclaims that the "basic analogy [of spectrum] to natural
resources is flawed. '8 2 Werbach is particularly critical of
analogies between spectrum and land8 3 because "[w]ireless
84
communication works differently" than managing land.
Werbach explains that what is important in spectrum
policy is not management of a tangible, physical resource,
but rather management of equipment that uses that
resource.8 5 To explain the problems that arise from
analogies of spectrum to natural resources, Werbach
himself presents a colorful analogy:
Spectrum policy falls victim to several fallacies. Each is
demonstrably false, yet remarkably durable. The most damaging
is the notion that there is such a thing as spectrum and that it
behaves as a fixed physical resource like land. Establishing a legal
regime under such a misconception is like sailing west from
Europe to find a shorter trade route to India. You might find
something interesting
along the way, but you will never achieve
86
your objective.

80. Stuart Buck, Replacing Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum Commons,

2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2,

10 (2002), http://stlr.stanford.edu/ STLRIArticles/

02_STLR_2/index.htm. Buck draws significantly on the work of Elinor Ostrom
on the management of common pool resources through commons. See, e.g.,
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONALS

FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). For another view of the difficulty of managing

common pool resources through the commons, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241

(2000).
81. See David P. Reed, Why Spectrum is Not Property-The Case for an
Entirely New Regime of Wireless Communications Policy (Feb. 27, 2001),
http://www.reed.com/dprframeweb/dprframe.asp?section=paper&fn=openspec.h
tml.
82. Werbach, supra note 28, at 886 n.116.
83. See id. at 866, 881, 885.
84. Id. at 885.
85. See id. at 914.
86. Id. at 882.
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This Article reengages this debate by suggesting that
while the connection to land may not be strong, there is
another natural 8 resource
with many attributes similar to
7
spectrum: water.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF RIPARIAN AND PRIOR APPROPRIATION
WATER DOCTRINES

In the United States, management of water resources
has generally been under either the riparian doctrine or the
prior appropriation doctrine.88 The riparian doctrine is
practiced primarily in the Eastern United States, and is
derived from English water law.8 9 Under this doctrine, all
owners of riparian land (land that is contiguous to a water
body) have the right to make withdrawals from that water
body. 90
There are limits to this right, however. The most
significant limitation is that withdrawals must be
considered "reasonable uses." 91 Courts determine what
constitutes a "reasonable use" on a case-by-case basis. 92 A
withdrawal for a particular purpose may be a reasonable
use when compared with one use, but not a reasonable use
when compared with a different use. 93 Another limit is that
the withdrawn water must be used on the parcel of land
that is riparian to that water body. 94

87. For more on the similarities between spectrum and water, including the
nature of rights to these resources as usufructuary as noted by Coase, see infra
Part V.
88. JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 9 (3d ed.
2000) [hereinafter STLA].
89. See id. at 9, 30.
90. For more on riparian doctrine, see id. at 20-39.
91. Reasonable use is determined by comparing the benefit derived from the
use with "the extent of detriment to [other] riparian proprietors." Snow v.
Parsons, 28 Vt. 459, 462 (1856).
92. See STLA, supra note 88, at 35-55.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 21-25.
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Transferability of these riparian rights is limited. A
transfer of riparian rights is only accomplished when the
95
riparian land underlying those rights is transferred itself.
Riparian doctrine adapted itself to the new demands of
industrial uses by creating the reasonable use requirement. 96 In recent years, the demands of growing
metropolitan areas and the rising frequency of extended
a
droughts has led to an adaptation of riparian doctrine:
' '97
push for what is known as "regulated riparianism.
After initial attempts to use riparian doctrine in the
Western United States ran into difficulties, 98 the prior
appropriation doctrine was established to deal with the
scarcity of water supplies presented in the West. 99 Under
this doctrine, a new user may appropriate unused water by
applying for a permit to use. Ownership of land is
unnecessary under this doctrine, and consequently, there
"are no limitations on the place of use." 100 Upon application,
an administrative agency then determines whether certain
requirements (including the availability of unappropriated
water) are met. Additionally, after the granting of the
permit, water must then be applied to a "beneficial use." 101
After this, "the right is perfected and the permit can be
the
converted to a license which remains in effect so long' 10as
2
use.
beneficial
and
reasonable
[a]
to
applied
is
water
Just as with riparianism, there are limits on the use of
an appropriative right. The most significant limit is the
distinction between senior and junior appropriators. Senior

95. See id.
96. See Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312);
Martin v. Bigelow, 2 Aik. 184 (Vt. 1827).
97. See STLA, supra note 88, at 76-80.
98. See id. at 285-86.
99. For more on the prior appropriation doctrine, see id. at 98-279.

100. Id. at 99.
101. Beneficial uses in appropriative doctrine are different from reasonable
uses in riparian doctrine. Beneficial uses can be understood as a "threshold"
concept, whereby once a use crosses the threshold, it is beneficial. On the other
hand, reasonable uses are understood comparatively, where to determine
whether a use is reasonable, one must judge it in comparison to some other use.
See id. at 122-82.
102. Id. at 185 (citing CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1600, 1627 (1992)).
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appropriators are those whose "priority date" 103 precedes
that of a junior appropriator. In times of limited supplies,
senior appropriators can withdraw their entire appropriated amount prior to any withdrawal by a junior appropriator.
Importantly, an appropriative right is transferable.
However, before a permit may be transferred, even
temporarily, regulatory approval is required. This approval
process is complex, and designed to 0ensure
that "third
4
parties" are not harmed by the transfer.
V. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN SPECTRUM AND WATER RESOURCES

This section describes the strong similarities between
the telecommunications spectrum and water resources as
resources; between the commons approach to spectrum and
riparian water rights; and between the property rights
approach to spectrum and the appropriation doctrine for
water rights. Due to these similarities, we conjecture that
our history with these property systems for water provide
significant lessons for the pressures and transitions we may
expect in implementing property systems for the telecommunications spectrum.
A. Similarities as a Resource
Spectrum and water share a number of characteristics
as natural resources. For many natural resources, such as
oil and gas, use of a portion of the resource by one user
prevents another user from using that particular portion.
However, for spectrum and water, multiple users can use
the same portion of the resource. For instance, the 2.4 GHz
band of telecommunication spectrum is used by a number of
different technologies: cordless phones, wireless internet
access, and even microwave ovens. While conflicts may
arise if all of these technologies are being used locally and

103. The priority date is the date when the water was initially applied to a
beneficial use. Columbia Basin Water Transactions Program Glossary,
http://www.cbwtp.org/jsp/cbwtp/glossary/show-glossary-items.jsp?g-letter=p
(last visited March 29, 2006).
104. See STLA, supra note 88, at 227-54.
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simultaneously, sequences of uses of the same bandwidth
by different users are compatible.
Similarly, water resources can also be used by many
different users. A reservoir can offer opportunities for
boating, swimming, and fishing, in addition to providing
drinking water. Additionally, water in an aqueduct that is
being delivered to one farmer can help propel (through
increased flow) delivery to another farmer. Even water that
is diverted and "used" by one farmer may still be used by
another farmer who
is downstream, through what is known
'10 5
as "return flow.
This multiple-use characteristic has important ramifications. Economists call resources that can be used by only
a single user "exhaustible," whereas resources that can be
used by multiple users (up to a point) are "nonexhaustible.' 1 06 Non-exhaustible resources are a category of
what economists call "public goods."'10 7 Economists generally believe that resources that are not public goods are best
08
allocated through a system of private property rights.
However, complications arise with public goods, and it is
difficult to determine the best way to allocate resources that
are public goods. 109 Thus, because both spectrum and water
can be used by multiple users, they will share similar issues
in determining appropriate allocation systems.
Another similarity between spectrum and water is their
mixed ownership structure. Some resources are owned by
private individuals (again, such as oil and gas), while others
are owned entirely by the public (such as air). Both
spectrum and water have an ownership structure that is
partially private and partially public. For spectrum, many
broadcasters have exclusive licenses to use a certain

105. Return flow is the quantity of water that returns to a water body
through runoff, percolation, or other means after it has been diverted. See infra
fig. 1.
106. See Peter Norman, Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods With Use
Exclusions, 71 REv. ECON. STUDIES 1163 (2004).

107. The other categories are non-excludable resources, from which nobody
is excluded once the resource has been produced, and resources that are both
non-exhaustible and non-excludable. See id.
108. See id.
109. As evidenced by the commons versus property rights debate for
telecommunications spectrum.

2006]

OF RAINBOWS AND RIVERS

179

bandwidth in a locality. However, the government
maintains its "ownership" of even these licensed bandwidths, and designates certain bandwidths for free use of
the entire public. 110
Similarly, many irrigators and industrial users have
private rights to put specific water to reasonable and
beneficial uses. 11 ' On the other hand, in many states, these
rights are subject to what is known as the "public trust
doctrine." Under this doctrine:
The waters of the State . . . are a natural resource owned by the
State in trust for the public and subject to the State's sovereign
power to plan, regulate, and control the withdrawal and use of
those waters, under112law, in order to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare.

Thus, ownership of water is also shared between private
individuals and the public.
This characteristic of shared ownership again has
important effects on the determination of appropriate
allocation structures. Conflicts between public and private
purposes will arise, and the allocation structure should
include mechanisms for resolving these conflicts.
One other significant characteristic that is present for
both spectrum and water is that the rights to the resource
are usufructuary in nature. A usufructuary right is the
right to use the resource, but not necessarily to possess the
resource. 113 This characteristic derives fundamentally from

110. NEW AM.
FOUND.,
REFORMING
THE GOVERNMENT'S
SPECTRUM
ALLOCATION CHART: A VISUAL STORY OF SPECIAL INTERESTS VERSUS THE PUBLIC
INTEREST,
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu:8000/courses/is247/sO2/readings/Ford

FoundationCommSpectrum. doc.
111. Beneficial use is a requirement that a particular use must be both
"permissible" and "not... wasteful in amount." STLA, supra note 88, at 124.
112. DALE B. THOMPSON,

PRIMARY LEAD, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON WATER RIGHTS AND REGULATORY AUTHORITIES, SUBMITTED TO
THE RHODE ISLAND WATER RESOUCES BOARD (2003) [hereinafter WATER RIGHTS

SUBCOMMITTEE

REPORT],

http://www.wrb.state.ri.us/programs/wa/wapac/water

rights/FindingsDec03.pdf (citing Regulated Riparian Model Water Code (1997)).
113. Douglas G. Caroom, Water Law in a Nutshell, or The Texas Law of
Water Development and Water Rights, Presented at the Texas Water Law
Institute, (Oct. 23-24 1997), http://bickerstaff.com/articles/waternut.htm.
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the shared ownership characteristic discussed above." 4
Spectrum users have the license to use a particular
bandwidth. Water users have the right to put certain water
to a reasonable and beneficial use. Again, this shared
characteristic will help analyze appropriate allocation
systems, because a usufructuary right is a more narrowly
defined right.
While
spectrum
and water
do
share
these
characteristics, they differ in a number of ways. For
instance, spectrum use is more dependent on technological
change. Managing conflicting water uses does rely on the
technological aspects of water extraction, application, and
runoff and discharge management, along with the physics
and hydrogeology of water diffusion. However, the effect on
other users is not as closely related to the sensitivity of
receivers in spectrum usage.
Additionally, the timing of allocation decisions differs
between spectrum and water. 115 Spectrum follows an ex
ante allocation scheme, whereby a potential user of the
spectrum resource must first apply for the right to use
spectrum before using it.116 On the other hand, water can
frequently follow an ex post allocation scheme. Under a
riparian scheme," 7 rights to use water are only determined
after a conflict has arisen. 118 One consequence of this
difference is that users of spectrum must make a larger
commitment prior to use of the resource, which requires a
larger investment. 1 9 Nonetheless, despite these differences,
their shared characteristics suggest that analysis of our
history with water law can improve our understanding of
the challenges in developing a property system for
spectrum.

114. However, it is important to note that these characteristics are not
identical, because shared ownership could have led to a different parsing of the
right.
115. I thank Jim Chen for pointing this difference out.
116. See Werbach, supra note 28, at 870-71.
117. Technically, under an appropriative scheme, a user should first apply
for a permit. See STLA, supra note 88, at 184. However, users sometimes may
begin using water first and then apply for a permit. Id. at 186.
118. See id. at 35-55.
119. For more on the implications of this investment requirement, see infra
Part VI.C.
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B. Shared Characteristicsof Spectrum Regimes and Water
Doctrines
In addition to these similarities as resources, there are
other strong similarities between the approaches associated
with spectrum and water. The commons approach to
spectrum shares many characteristics with the riparian
doctrine for water rights. Under the commons approach,
ownership of equipment for sending or receiving telecom120
munications broadcasts is required to use spectrum.
Ownership of this equipment thus serves as a limit on the
availability of the commons right to spectrum. However, if
someone has this equipment, that person is free to use
spectrum, subject only to the constraints of tort law. Under
tort law, behavior is constrained by the "reasonable
person"'121 standard. Thus, under the commons approach,
spectrum is allocated only to those who own the necessary
equipment, and is allocated between different users and
uses through the application of the reasonable person
standard.
Under the riparian doctrine, ownership of riparian land
is required to use water. 122 Ownership of this land thus
serves as a limit to the riparian right to water. However, if
someone owns riparian land, that person is free to use
123
water, subject only to the "reasonable use" doctrine.
Thus, under the riparian doctrine, water is allocated only to
those who own riparian land, and is allocated between
different users and uses through the application of the
reasonable use doctrine. The similarities between the
commons approach and riparian doctrine are therefore
strong, and much can be learned about the commons
approach by examining the history of the riparian doctrine.
Moreover, the property rights approach to spectrum
shares many characteristics with the appropriation doctrine
for water rights. Under the property rights approach,
someone wishing to have a guaranteed right to use
120. Werbach, supra note 28, at 883.
121. A reasonable person takes the care that a person of ordinary prudence
would use in the same circumstances. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 155 (7th ed. 2000).
122. See STLA, supra note 88, at 21-25.
123. See id. at 20-55.
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spectrum must obtain a permit to do so. Ownership of
equipment is insufficient. Once somebody has a permit,
they are free to use the spectrum, subject to the conditions
of their permit. Furthermore, subject to oversight by a
regulatory agency, somebody with a spectrum permit can
transfer her right to use spectrum. Also, under the
Faulhaber and Farber idea of an implied non-interference
easement, while someone who owns a permit has a
guaranteed right to use spectrum, if that person is not
using their designated portion of the spectrum at some
particular time, then others have the right to use that
with the
spectrum, because they will not be interfering
124
permit owners' right to use that spectrum.
Meanwhile, under the appropriations doctrine, someone
wishing to have a right to use water must obtain a permit
to do so. 12 5 Ownership of land is insufficient. Once
somebody has a permit, they are allowed to take water and
126
use it, subject to the conditions of their permit.
Furthermore, in many jurisdictions, subject to oversight by
a regulatory agency, somebody with an appropriative
permit can transfer their right to use water. 127 Also, under
the appropriations doctrine, if someone with an appropriative permit is not using their water, that water is then freed
for others to appropriate.
While there are these similarities, there is one
important distinction between the property rights approach
and appropriation doctrine. In spectrum, we had the
advantage of having extra resources available: as technology improved, more spectra became available to allocate to
new users. Hence, we were able to put up this extra
spectrum for auction for new users. 128 As a result, we have
not needed to initiate markets and transfers initially.
On the other hand, water resources in the Western
United States have been significantly constrained. As a

124. See generally Faulhaber & Farber, supranote 68.
125. See STLA, supra note 88, at 98-111.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 223-54.
128. See supra note 2.
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need for markets and
result, there has been a strong
129
transfers of some water rights.
Nonetheless, the surplus of currently available
spectrum is ending. Even if additional technological
advances could provide more spectrum, if one believes in
Say's law-that supply creates its own demand-then even
this new surplus will also end, and the two situations
become more similar again. As a result, the similarities
between the property rights approach and appropriation
doctrine remain strong. Much can then be learned about the
property rights approach by examining the history of the
appropriation doctrine.
VI. LESSONS FROM WATER LAW FOR SPECTRUM

Because of these similarities, there are many insights
to spectrum policy we can gain from our analysis of the
history of water law.
A. Transitionsfrom PureProperty Rights Systems
One of these insights is the possible impediment to the
transferability of spectrum property rights presented by
third parties. The free transferability of spectrum rights is
one of the most important justifications for the efficiency of
the property rights system. 130 For instance, consider the
following example. Alice is the current holder of the right to
use a certain band of spectrum. Alice runs a business that
generates a significant profit and that must have this band
of spectrum to operate. The value of this right to use
spectrum to Alice is the present net value of her profits
from operating this business, which is one million dollars
($1,000,000). However, Bob wants to start a new business
that would also need to use this same band of spectrum to
operate. The value of this spectrum to Bob is one and a half
million dollars ($1,500,000).
If the property right to use this band of spectrum is
freely transferable, Alice could sell this right, say for
$1,300,000. This sale is favorable to both Alice and Bob,
129. See STLA, supra note 88, at 223-27.
130. Increasing the incentive to invest to improve the value of the right is
the other most important justification.
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because Alice is being paid more than the right is worth to
her, and Bob is paying less than the right is worth to him.
Society also benefits from this sale. To calculate social
welfare, we add the values to the different individuals in
society. The value to society of the right before the sale is
its value to Alice, $1,000,000. However, after the sale, Alice
now has $1,300,000 cash, and Bob has a net benefit from
the sale of $200,000 (which is his value, $1,500,000 minus
the price he paid, $1,300,000). Adding the two together, we
see that the value of the right to society after the sale is
$1,500,000. Social welfare has thus increased by $500,000
because of this sale. This increase is equal to the sum of the
increased value to Alice ($300,000) plus the net benefit to
Bob ($200,000).
In a similar manner, any trade that will make both
parties better off will also benefit society. Social welfare will
improve by the sum of the two parties' benefits from the
trade. As a result, the transferability of spectrum rights
seems to make a property rights regime an efficient approach.
Over the past one hundred years, we have had some
experiences with transfers of appropriative rights to water.
One place where there has been significant interest in
water transfers is California. In California, much of the
rights to the first priorities in water allocation are held by
farmers, while urban areas regularly have much lower
priority. 131 Consequently, during extended droughts, such
as the 1987-1992 drought, there is significant interest in
transfers between farmers with first priority to cities that
have access to much less water but do have significant
funds to purchase water if it would be made available
132
through water markets.
While there has been significant interest in water
markets, there have been significantly fewer transfers of
water rights than might be expected.' 33 A primary reason

131. See Tony Perry, Imperial Valley Farmers Urged to Conserve Water, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2002, at 7.

132. Dale B. Thompson, Defining a New Market for a Common Resource:
Lessons from the 1991-92 California Drought Water Bank (1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
133. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional Perspectives on Water Policy
and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1993).
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for this lack of transfers is the institutional protection of
"third parties" to water transfers.13 4 Water transfers occur
directly between two parties-the buyer and seller.
However, a wide variety of "third parties" also may be
affected by these transfers. Early on, it was recognized that
the rights of junior appropriators who took advantage of the
non-use of water by senior appropriators may be harmed by
135
the transfer of a senior appropriator's water right.
Additionally, downstream users of an upstream appropriator's "return flow" would also be harmed if the upstream
appropriator
was allowed
to transfer her entire
1 36
appropriative water right.
More recently, new third-party concerns have been
raised about communities affected by "out-of-basin" water
transfers. 137 The most famous such case is that of the
Owens Valley community in California. This case is
discussed in Marc Reisner's novel, Cadillac Desert.138 The
139
Owens Valley was once a fertile agricultural area.
However, through a number of machinations, the City of
Los Angeles acquired the rights to Owens Valley water and
40
constructed a long aqueduct to access this water.
Consequently, almost no water remained for use by Owens
Valley residents and all farming and development left the

134. See STLA, supra note 88, at 246-57.
135. See id. at 230-35.
136. See infra fig. 2.
137. See Joseph Sax, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the

Privatizationof Water, 1 WEST-NORTHWEST 13 (1994); Barton Thompson, Water
Law as a Pragmatic Exercise: Professor Joseph Sax's Water Scholarship, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 363 (1998); see also A. Dan Tarlock, New Water Transfer
Restrictions: The West Returns to Riparianism, 27 WATER RESOURCES RES. 987
(1991); COMM. ON WESTERN WATER MGMT., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER
TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992);

Dale B. Thompson, Defining a New Market for a Common Resource: Lessons
from the 1991-92 California Drought Water Bank (1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
138. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC
DISAPPEARING WATER (1993).
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139. The Owens Valley Committee, Recent Water History, http://www
.ovcweb.org/OwensValley/Waterhistory.html (last visited March 29, 2006).
140. Id.
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Owens Valley. 141 This incident continues to cast a large
shadow over all water transfers in California.
As a result of these concerns, a number of procedural
barriers to water transfers have been put in place to protect
third parties. 142 A party wishing to transfer her right must
prove that this water satisfies "historical use," in order to
protect those junior appropriators who invested in reliance
on the nonuse of senior appropriators. 143 Furthermore,
144 to
transfers may also be limited to "consumptive use"
45
protect downstream users of upstream return flow.' These
protections arise generally under the "no injury" rule, which
says that "a proposed change will be approved only if it will
not injure junior appropriators."'146 Meanwhile, to protect
communities, most transfers 47 require approval through a
lengthy, formal application process. 48 During this process,
communities and other users have the opportunity to file
protests against a proposed transfer. 149 Even if a transfer is
initially approved, there is a possibility that the board may
then "reconsider" the transfer and deny it later. This
extremely lengthy, cumbersome, and risky process has been

141. Id. It is now an area attractive to migratory birds because of its natural
characteristics and lack of human activity. See The Owens Valley Committee,
The Owens Valley, http://www.ovcweb.org/OwensValley/OwensValley.html (last
visited March 29, 2006).
142. See K. William Easter et al., Formal and informal markets for water:
Institutions,performance, and constraints,14 WORLD BANK OBSERVER 99 (1999);
B.C. Saliba, Do Water Markets "Work"?, 23 WATER RESOURCES RES. 1113 (1987);
Bonnie Colby, Transaction Costs and Efficiency in Western Water Allocation, 72
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1184 (1990).
143. STLA, supra note 88, at 236.
144. Consumptive use is the amount of the water equal to the amount of
water diverted minus the return flow. Columbia Basin Water Transactions
Program Glossary,
http://www.cbwtp.org/jsp/cbwtp/glossary/show-glossaryitems.jsp?g-letter=c (last visited March 29, 2006).
145. See STLA, supra note 88, at 227-35.
146. Id. at 230.
147. Exceptions are primarily within irrigation districts, and in emergency
situations such as the California Drought Water Bank. See STLA, supra note
88, at 226-27.
148. See id. at 246-54.
149. Id. at 229.
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a significant barrier to150the free transferability of appropriative water permits.
Returning to our prior example of a spectrum transfer,
we see that third party concerns could affect the efficiency
of a spectrum transfer. Earlier, we found that, from
society's perspective, considering only the effect on Alice
and Bob, social welfare would be increased by $500,000 by
the transfer from Alice to Bob. However, let us now add in
the effect of this transfer on third parties. Alice's customer,
Charlie, had made a significant investment in technology to
utilize a service provided by Alice's band of spectrum. Bob's
use of this spectrum will conflict with Charlie's use, and
consequently, Bob will not allow Charlie to use this
spectrum. As a result, Charlie will have to find an alternative band of spectrum for his service, and will need to invest
an additional $900,000 in technology to receive the same
quality service as he previously had while using Alice's
band of spectrum.
This additional cost to Charlie therefore represents a
$900,000 opportunity cost of this transfer, and will reduce
social welfare after the transfer to $600,000 (equals
previous social value of $1,500,000 minus the $900,000
opportunity cost). As a result, social welfare is actually
reduced by $400,000 (equals the prior social value of
$1,000,000 minus the net after-social value of $600,000) by
the transfer between Alice and Bob. Nonetheless, if Charlie
has no right to object to this transfer, it will go through
because both Alice and Bob individually benefit from it.
This example and our history with water transfers suggest,
therefore, that a property rights regime for spectrum rights
should pay careful attention to the effects of third parties
from transfers of spectrum rights. When these third party
effects are taken into consideration, the efficiency
advantages of the property rights system may be
significantly limited.
Questions then arise regarding who the third parties to
transfers of spectrum rights would be, and in what
situations these third party effects would be significant.
Our hypothetical example suggests one possible third party

150. Bonnie Colby has suggested that the transaction costs associated with
water transfers act as a substitute for third-party effects. Colby, supra note 142,
at 1186.
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group: licensed users of a particular band of spectrum who
have made significant investments in technological
equipment to utilize that band of spectrum, where their use
will not be permitted after the transfer of the spectrum
right. For example, many people have made significant
investments in cellular phones that utilize a certain band of
spectrum currently controlled by Verizon. If some other
company were to offer Verizon an extremely large sum of
money to transfer this right, our experience with water
markets suggests that in addition to considering the effects
on the profits of Verizon, the concerns of third parties that
have made significant investments in Verizon cellular
phones should also be considered before approval of the
transfer. Another possible third party group that might be
harmed by a transfer is users of other frequencies subject to
the effects of intermodulation. 151 Intermodulation occurs
when "strong tones" from one channel "introduce spurious
signal energy in a troublesome amount into an adjacent
channel," thereby causing interference. 152 This group would
be detrimentally affected by a transfer if the effects of
intermodulation under the new use were greater than
under the previous use, perhaps due to transmissions made
using higher power.
These concerns could lead to a future transition away
from a property system for spectrum based on the property
rights approach. As in the case with water, third parties
may turn to the legal system or the political system to
enjoin, delay, or block a proposed transfer. 153 An

151. I thank James Speta for suggesting this.
152. Anritsu Corporation, Intermodulation Distortion (IMD), Scorpion
Option 13, Application Note (2000), http://www.anritsu.co.jp/Products/
pdfe/ScorpionIMDMeasurement.pdf; see also Michael Whittaker & Helen
Yang, Managing Spectrum Licensing in Australia (1997), http://gis.esri.com/
library/userconflproc97/proc97/to300/pap261/p261.htm.
153. Some may suggest that the political power of third parties may be
limited because as a group of consumers; they may face high organizational
costs and have little information. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY
OF DEMOCRACY (1957); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965);
JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (1980). However, this problem

may be solved by a political entrepreneur, who could provide the organization
and information to these consumers, thereby empowering them. See generally
Dale B. Thompson, Political Entrepreneurs and Consumer Interest Groups:
Theory and Evidence from Emissions Trading (2002) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
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administrative institution may then arise in response to
these concerns. This institution would include a procedural
mechanism for reviewing the effects of transfers on third
parties. As a result, this procedural mechanism for
protecting third party rights may become an important
component of a property-rights-based system for spectrum.
This mechanism may have significant effects on the
efficiency of the property rights system. In addition to the
transaction costs of operating this mechanism, a significant
number of trades would not occur, as suggested by our
experience with water markets. While this mechanism
might prevent some trades that were, on balance, a net
detriment to social welfare due to their third party impacts,
it is likely that a large number of socially beneficial trades
will be prevented due to the individual parties' concerns
with the lengthy, cumbersome, and risky process of
spectrum rights transfer approval. In the end, this
mechanism might curtail trades to the point that, after this
transition, the property rights system for spectrum might
look very similar to the allocation system we currently use
for spectrum.
B. Transitionsfrom Pure Commons Systems
Another lesson we can learn about property systems for
spectrum is how a commons approach might adapt to
increasing scarcity. One argument for utilizing a commons
approach now is that if conditions change, it may be easier
to transition from a commons to a property rights approach,
in contrast to the difficulty of transitioning from a property
rights to a commons approach. This argument recognizes
that there may come a time in which high-valued uses of
spectrum may not be well served by a commons approach,
perhaps due to interference. 154 This argument suggests that
the governing system for the spectrum commons will then
enable the creation of a niche of spectrum that will be
governed by a property rights approach. This would then
result in a hybrid approach to spectrum.

154. We currently have some frequencies as a commons. However, commons
advocates do support adding additional frequencies to be used as commons. This
suggests that even commons advocates recognize the problem of over-utilization
leading to interference under a commons. See Benkler, supra note 14, at 76-80.
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However, our experience with transitions in water law
suggests that the transition will not be to this hybrid
approach, but rather to a regulated commons. The riparian
system has undergone many transitions over time. One
significant transition was when water law was initially
established in the Western United States. Initially, the
doctrine applied to water rights in the West was the
riparian doctrine, which was then used in the Eastern
United States. 155 However, the inappropriateness of the
riparian doctrine in the arid West quickly became clear,
and the prior appropriation doctrine was instead developed
15 6
and implemented in Western states.
Two different approaches to this transition were tried.
One was to completely abolish existing riparian rights, and
implement a rights system based only on prior appropriations. 157 The leading state that took this approach was
Colorado. 158 The other was to adopt a hybrid approach
where existing riparian rights would continue to be
recognized, but that all new water rights would be under
the prior appropriations doctrine. 159 The leading state in
the hybrid approach was California. 160
Our experience in operating the hybrid approach in
California suggests that attempting to transition from a
commons to a hybrid approach for spectrum may be
troublesome. In California, conflicts between appropriators
and riparians arose and led to significant political battles.
These battles were highlighted in the 1884 case Lux v.
Haggin, where the California Supreme Court first found for
the riparian interest. 161 This decision "set off a political fire
storm.' 16 2 The public outcry convinced the court to vacate
its earlier decision and rehear the case. 163 Nonetheless, the
155. STLA, supra note 88, at 284-89.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 286-306.
158. Id. Other Colorado doctrine states include Arizona, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. See id. at 294.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Lux v. Haggin, 4 P. 919 (Cal. 1884).
162. STLA, supra note 88, at 297.
163. Id.
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court again upheld the rights of the riparians over the
appropriators. 164
In later years, the problem of unexercised riparian
rights that would have priority over all appropriative rights
generated significant risks for appropriators in California.
In 1913, the California legislature attempted to abolish
unexercised riparian rights, but this statute was later ruled
unconstitutional. 16 5 Only more recently has California
found a solution to this problem, where unexercised riparian rights in adjudicated water bodies are not abolished but
lower than previously established
are instead given priority
166
appropriative rights.
Our more recent experiences with riparian transitions
suggest that, instead of transitioning to a hybrid property
rights-commons property system, the more likely response
to increased scarcity would be to transition from a commons
system to a regulated commons. While initially, Eastern
states in the United States seemed to have plentiful water,
over the past fifty years, the pressures of extended droughts
and the rapid increase of urban populations has put
significant pressure on allocations derived from the riparian
system. Consequently, over the past twenty-five years, a
number of Eastern states have adopted a form of regulated
riparianism, requiring permits for use of water. 16 7 This
drafting of the
development has been punctuated by 6the
8
Regulated Riparian Model Water Code.'
An alternative to a regulated riparian system in order
to deal with these new stresses would be to adopt a
property-rights-trading system. However, the principal
reason for the movement to a regulated riparian system

164. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (1886).
165. Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal.
1935).
166. Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 599 P.2d 656 (Cal. 1979).
167. These include Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. See STLA, supra note 88, at 79. Additionally, a recent
recommendation is that Rhode Island also adopt a regulated riparian system.
WATER RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 112.
168. AM. SOC'Y OF CIVIL ENG'RS, REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE
(Joseph W. Dellapenna ed., 1997).
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rather than a property-rights-trading system is to reduce
the transition costs and risks that would result from a shift
towards trading.169 A regulated riparian system would
functionally operate very similarly to the previous riparian
system, except in times of extended drought. 170 As a result,
during nondrought times, the transition could seem very
simple, and investments made under the previous riparian
system would continue to remain useful. A trading system
would operate very differently in all times, and so in
comparison, a transition to a regulated riparian system is
more attractive. As a result, many Eastern states look to a
regulated riparian system
to address these new stresses on
171
their water resources.
This experience suggests that in the future, if
"shortages" of spectrum arise under a commons approach,
the likely response will be to transition to a regulated
commons. Similar to our experience with water, a transition
to a regulated commons would be more simple than
transitioning to a hybrid system involving limited trading.
Also, the regulations could then be designed to protect
previous investments more fully than under a trading
system. In the face of shortages of spectrum, it is likely that
groups with significant investments in the utilization of
that spectrum will be harmed by these shortages. These
groups may then push for modifications to the spectrum
allocation system. These groups would be well organized,
and have considerably more political power than other
groups who might also have an interest in the response to
the shortage. 172 These groups can then utilize their power
to "capture" the administrative agency in charge of
regulating the commons. 173

169. WATER RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 112.
170. Id.
171. STLA, supra note 88, at 79.
172. The political power of well-organized interest groups in spectrum policy
is demonstrated by the power exerted by HAM radio operators and radio and
television broadcasters, who have been able to utilize this power to delay a
transition away from our current system. See Cory Doctorow, What Community
WiFi Can Learn From Hams, http:/fboingboing.hexten.net/20030801 _archive.
html.
173. For more on regulatory capture, see Richard A. Posner, Theories of
Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 335 (1974); Gary S. Becker,

A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for PoliticalInfluence, 98 Q.J.
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Well-organized groups would therefore have a strong
incentive to push for a regulated commons, rather than a
market system. The reason for this is that the operation of
a regulatory system enables well-organized interest groups
to initially influence the design of that system, and continue
to exert strong influence over the operation of that system.
In contrast, in a market, the influence of these groups
would be limited to the initial design of a market system,
and also possibly to enforcement of that system's rules. As a
result, by pushing for a regulated commons, well-organized
interest groups with significant investments in the use of
spectrum could then utilize their political influence to
ensure that the system would protect their investments.
Thus, both our experiences with water and our current
experience with spectrum suggest that a commons system,
under the pressure of shortages in spectrum, would
transition to a regulated commons.
This can also be understood with the following example.
In this example, the question is: how would a commons
system respond to increasing interference problems that
significantly damage the usefulness of a very valuable
application that utilizes a commons frequency?
Let's say that some frequency, say 1.8 GHz, is a new
frequency that is opened to the commons approach. As a
result, a few inventors design devices across different
applications that communicate using this frequency. Of
these applications, let us assume that there are three that
are small commercial successes, with each of these having a
few devices sold and operated (and all others are
unsuccessful). We also assume that, for each of these
applications, the chance of slightly delayed174or lost communications does not impede their usefulness.
However, a little later, another inventor also uses this
same spectrum portion to design a new application. This
application is much more sensitive to interference
problems, but initially, the paucity of other devices allows
interference to be kept to a minimum. While being very
ECON. 371 (1983); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMT. SC. 3 (1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory

of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976).
174. This assumption means that these three applications could continue to
operate successfully under a commons approach because interference would not
present a problem.
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sensitive, this application also becomes extremely
valuable. 175 While things operate smoothly for a short
period, after a little time, the other three applications then
become more popular, and more devices using the 1.8 GHz
band begin operating. The higher utilization of this bandwidth now creates significant interference problems for the
extremely valuable application, problems that existing
technology cannot remedy. What will be the response to this
situation?
There are four possible responses. Some might suggest
that technology could improve to eliminate the interference
problem, which would enable us to continue under the pure
commons approach. However, as these other devices continue to multiply in the marketplace, the pace of technological improvement may be unable to keep up with the
pace of interference.
Another response might be for the inventor of this very
valuable application to acquire some exclusive-rights
frequency and redesign the application to utilize that
frequency. However, if successful, this response would
result in the complete loss of the investment consumers of
this application 176 had made in the purchase and implementation of earlier devices using the commons frequency.
Because of the magnitude of this investment, it is politically
likely that these consumers would successfully push for
some alternative response.
Yet another possibility would be to transition this
particular commons spectrum frequency into a propertyrights-based, exclusive-rights frequency. Under this approach, the government could award property rights to the
different inventors of the devices that utilize the spectrum,

175. For instance, it may be designed to facilitate certain extremely
valuable financial transactions. As noted above, commons advocates do not
always advocate opening all spectrum frequencies to commons, and instead
might use some mix between exclusive-rights frequencies and commons
frequencies. Benkler, supra note 14, at 33. If exclusive-rights spectrum
frequencies were available, one might ask why an inventor of an extremely
valuable application might choose to utilize a commons frequency. The answer
is simply that these inventions are very risky, and that purchasing the right to
use an exclusive-rights frequency could be more costly than the inventor would
be willing to invest, prior to learning the true (extremely large) value of the
invention.
176. For example, wealthy financial institutions.
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and if the inventor of the very valuable application could
acquire all of these rights, then the interference problem
would be solved. However, there are two problems with this
response. One is the "hold out" problem: each of the other
inventors would have a strong incentive to hold out against
selling their right to spectrum, in an effort to extract the
maximum amount from the inventor of the very valuable
application. The other problem is the same problem
mentioned above in the property rights transition section:
"third parties." Under this response, the inventors of the
other devices would be compensated, but none of that
compensation would then flow to the third-party purchasers
of the less valuable devices. 177 Just as in the case with
water, a transition like this that deprived these third
parties of all economically viable use of their prior
investments in these devices may lead to takings claims
against the government. 178 This response, therefore, seems
likely to be either ineffective, or politically and legally
problematic.
In the end, just as has happened with riparian systems,
the most likely response seems to be that regulations would
be applied to this frequency to reduce the impact of
interference problems. Both the vendor and the customers
of the extremely valuable application would have strong
incentives to lobby for regulations that would protect their
use of this portion of the spectrum. And so the likely
outcome in this case is to transition to a regulated
commons.
Consequently, a likely transition to a regulated
commons presents an argument against adopting the
commons approach for spectrum. The one thing that both
property rights advocates and commons advocates seem to
agree upon is the inappropriateness of the current
regulatory system for allocating spectrum. 179 However,
there might be significant similarities between how the
current FCC regulatory system operates and how a

177. One might suggest extending the awarding of property rights to these
third parties also, but this would multiply the hold-out problem because each
third party then could also hold out.
178. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
179. See Werbach, supranote 28, at 871-77.

196

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

regulated commons system would operate. In the end, a
transition to a regulated commons could end up looking
similar to our current system, with all of its associated
problems.
C. An Alternative Structure to Enable More Flexibility to
Respond to TransitionalForces
Thus, we learn two major lessons from water law. Our
first lesson is based on experiences with prior appropriation
doctrine. These experiences suggest that concerns about
"third party" effects could be very detrimental to the
efficiency of a property rights system of spectrum allocation.
These pressures would likely lead to a transition to a more
regulated system of property rights. Our second lesson is
based on experiences with transitions in riparian doctrine.
These transitions suggest that under pressure due to
scarcity, a commons system for spectrum allocation likely
will transition to a regulated commons, which could look
similar to our current system for spectrum with all of its
attendant problems.
Taken together, these lessons suggest additional
criticisms of both a property rights approach and a
commons approach. Yet our experiences with water law
also suggest an alternative structure-one that more
properly combines aspects of both property rights and
commons.
One of the more interesting recent developments in
water law is the Environmental Water Account (EWA). An
extremely difficult issue when protecting environmental
interests in water bodies is the timing of when these
interests are most endangered. While pollutant load 180 and
pollutant type certainly are major factors in protecting
environmental interests in waters, the quantity of water in
the water body itself plays perhaps the most important role.
For many pollutants, a sufficient quantity of water can
enable dilution to the point that the presence of the
pollutants in their diluted state is no longer harmful to the

180. Pollutant load is the quantity of pollutants introduced into water
bodies. EPA, Terminology Reference System, http://iaspub.epa.gov/trs/ trs-proc
_qry.alphabet?pterm_nm=P.
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environmental interests.18 1 Therefore, a key factor in the
environmental health of a water body is often as simple as
the quantity of water in it.
Consequently, environmental interests tend to be
threatened most during extended droughts, which
inevitably lead to significant water quantity reductions in
water bodies. We want to be able to save more water for
these environmental interests during times of drought.
Unfortunately, these periods of extended droughts occur at
precisely the same time as when nonenvironmental
interests are most affected by the scarcity of water
resources. In other words, the time when the fish need more
water the most is exactly the same time that farmers and
cities need more water the most. This dilemma presents
severe obstacles to protecting environmental interests in
water bodies.
To deal with this, one approach has been to create what
are known as Environmental Water Accounts.18 2 An EWA
takes advantage of both temporal and locational flexibility
in water resources to balance these competing needs for
water during water scarcities. While there is a natural
conflict between environmental and nonenvironmental
interests for water resources in times of drought, a manager
of an EWA can nonetheless use temporal transfers of water
to protect environmental interests. The manager does this
by acquiring additional water resources in times of plenty,
and then utilizing excess capacity in reservoirs to store the
water for later use.
Additionally, while environmental interests in water
bodies have localized needs for water, i.e., water in the
Green River does not help fish in the Blue River,

181. See Dale B. Thompson, An Examination of the Consequences of
Political, Administrative, and Legal Institutions on the Implementation and
Performance of Environmental Policies (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Stanford University) (on file with author); Dale B. Thompson, Beyond BenefitCost Analysis: Institutional Transaction Costs and the Regulation of Water

Quality, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 517 (1999).
182. For more on Environmental Water Accounts, see California Bay Delta
Authority, http://calwater.ca.gov/Programs/EnvironmentalWaterAccount/Envir
onmentalWaterAccount.shtml (last visited Feb. 10, 2006); Stanford Law School
Environmental and Natural Resources Law and Policy Program, Bay-Delta:
The Environmental Water Account, SLS Case No. 039-99 (1999), http://case
studies.stanford.edu.
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nonenvironmental interests are less concerned with where
the water came from than with ensuring that the water
reaches them. This characteristic provides locational
flexibility that the manager of the EWA can utilize to
protect environmental interests. For example, two rivers
flow through the town of Blackstown, the Green and the
Blue. Fish live in the Blue River but not in the Green.
However, the town's permit specifies that withdrawals for
the town's water supplies should occur from the Blue River.
In times of scarce water supplies, withdrawals by the town
are detrimental to the fish in the Blue River.
On the other hand, the EWA owns rights to withdraw
water from the Green River. To protect the fish in the Blue
River, when necessary, the manager of the EWA can "trade"
withdrawal rights from the Green River to the town for its
withdrawal rights from the Blue River.183 After this
transfer, the manager of the EWA can then ensure that the
water remains in the Blue River and thereby protect the
fish in the Blue River. As this example demonstrates, two
important characteristics of EWAs are the ability to collect
timely information on the precise location of environmental
needs for water, and the ability to utilize alternative
transportation facilities to "wheel" the water involved in a
transfer. 184
This example suggests an alternative property system
to balance the competing interests of different users of
spectrum: a property rights system involving trading of
spectrum rights and including as a significant component a
Spectrum Commons Account (SCA). The way the SCA
would work is as follows. Most spectra would be owned as a
private property right, for the use of an individual owner.
However, one of the owners of spectrum would be the SCA.
Spectra owned by the SCA could be used by anyone, and
would thus have the characteristics of a commons.
Meanwhile, the manager of an SCA would then buy and sell

183. Recall that, due to restraints on transfers arising out of protections for
third parties, the operation of an appropriation system is very rigid, and this
type of transfer would normally not occur without outside intervention.
184. Water "wheeling" refers to using someone else's facilities to convey
marketed water. See STLA, supra note 88, at 645.
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certain portions of spectrum rights
that are available on the
18 5
general spectrum rights market.
In doing so, the manager of the SCA can take
advantage of flexibilities to provide additional spectra for
use as a commons. Flexibilities in spectrum derive from two
sources: applications where interference poses minimal
adverse consequences and devices that are designed (or
could be redesigned at a very low cost) to enable operation
over a wider range of frequencies without any significant
loss in performance.
There would be two purposes in operating the SCA. One
would be to expand the amount of spectrum available as a
commons resource. The other would be to minimize the
effects on third parties from transfers of spectrum rights.
On this second purpose, it could be important to grant third
parties certain statutory rights that would be satisfied
through a properly executed SCA operation. One of the
important backdrops to EWAs is the Endangered Species
Act (ESA).18 6 Certain species of the fish protected in the
operation of an EWA are also protected under the ESA.
This backdrop provides incentives for EWA managers to
properly consider the needs of these fish, and for other
water users to cooperate with EWA managers to prevent
185. An SCA is similar to the "parks" suggestion of Faulhaber and Farber,
supra note 68, in that a portion of the spectrum would be utilized as commons
under an otherwise property rights regime. However, the significant difference
is that the extent of commons frequencies would be actively managed by SCA
managers, including possibly selling a formerly commons frequency for
exclusive use.
The SCA manager would be different from "band managers" discussed in
FCC Regulations, 47 C.F.R. § 27.603 (2002). Band managers are licensed
holders of the right to utilize a certain frequency, who then lease that right to
other (and sometimes multiple) users. Band managers have the responsibility
to ensure that these other users comply with applicable FCC rules and laws. In
contrast, SCA managers would be additionally responsible for managing
transfers of the frequency, and for managing third parties affected by the
transfer. For more on band managers, see James B. Speta, Deregulating
Telecommunications in Internet Time, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063, 1120, n.265
(2004); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between

Private and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2007, 2068 n.199 (2003); Benkler,
supra note 14, at 65 n.47.
186. Fact Sheet, California Bay-Delta Auth., The Environmental Water
Account: Reducing Conflict Between Fishery Management and Water Supply
(Jan. 22, 2003), http://calwater.ca.gov/Newsroom/FactSheets/FactSheet_ EWA
WhitePaper-1-22-03.pdf.
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outcomes that could lead to litigation under the ESA. In a
similar manner, providing third parties certain statutory
rights might then provide proper incentives to SCA managers, and induce owners of spectrum rights to cooperate with
SCA managers before conducting frequency transfers that
might affect third parties.
One of the important lessons from EWAs is that the
manager needs to have complete information to properly
respond to changing conditions. Under an SCA, this
18 7
information would come through a registration system.
In an SCA registration system, the vendor of devices
utilizing a commons spectrum frequency could decide to
register its device with the SCA. Registration by the vendor
would entail provision of information about the device,
concerning its susceptibility to interference problems, and
the steps that the vendor would expect to be necessary to
enable the devices to operate on a different commons
frequency. The benefit for registration would be that a
vendor could then include a symbol on the device (and in
marketing literature) indicating that this device had the
opportunity of protection under an SCA.' 88 Consumers of
this device could then go on the internet to register their
own purchase and use of the device. Consumers that did so
would be entitled to the "third-party insurance" provided by
the SCA. Registration by both vendors and consumers
would provide the information an SCA manager would need
to determine whether for any proposed purchase of
commons frequency, the offered price would exceed the
costs to all affected parties.
The registration system would also extend to protect
third parties to transfers of private spectrum rights. Prior
to making a transfer that might violate statutory rights of
third parties, as discussed above, the holder of a private
spectrum right could first approach the SCA manager. Let
us assume that this transfer would damage certain thirdparty interests. The SCA manager would examine the
consequences of this transfer on third parties, and then

187. Registration is also important under prior appropriation doctrine, and
under regulated riparian systems. See STLA, supra note 88, at 183-87, 79-91.
188. This advantage would be similar to the ability of banks to advertise
that "deposits up to $100,000 are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation."
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determine the circumstances 8 9 under which the flexibilities
of the SCA could protect these third parties. In order to do
so, the SCA manager would again need registration
information from both the vendors and consumers of
devices utilizing this frequency. After receiving this information, the SCA manager could then determine whether it
would be possible to protect the third parties affected by
this proposed transfer. If so, the SCA manager could then
give an "SCA stamp of approval" to the transfer, which
would relieve the trading parties of any liability under the
third-party protection statute. 190 The SCA manager would
then also be responsible for providing registered third
parties with equipment' 91 utilizing a commons spectrum
frequency, paid for by the former holder of the private
spectrum right. In this manner, the SCA manager could be
an important party to transfers of private spectrum rights.
An example may better explicate the operation of an
SCA. We shall again consider the example of the extremely
valuable invention susceptible to interference problems
using a commons frequency. Under the pure commons
system, as discussed above, this would likely lead to a
regulated commons. An SCA manager, however, would be
able to more directly deal with this.
Consider a portion of spectrum initially operated as a
commons, part of an SCA. A number of technologies utilize
this frequency. One of these technologies becomes
extremely
valuable.
Furthermore,
this
particular
technology is sensitive to interference from others using the
same frequency for other technologies. What can be done?
If this was a traditional commons regime, a technical
solution would be the only way for the owner of this
technology to alleviate this interference problem. For
instance, this technology could be utilized by better
identifying the source of the signals and ensuring that this
source is a desired one. Meanwhile, under a mixed
commons-property-rights regime as has been discussed
189. Such circumstances might include a payment by the holder of the
spectrum right to cover the costs of purchasing new devices for third parties.
190. Under the same third-party protection statute, liability would instead
shift to the SCA manager, upon proof that the transfer resulted in substantial,
uncompensated damage to a third party.
191. Perhaps all that would be required is changing the default frequency.
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previously, 192 where a portion of bandwidth is devoted to
commons and another portion devoted to property rights,
another alternative arises. The owner of the technology
may purchase a portion of the spectrum that operates under
the property rights regime. She can then modify the
technology to utilize this alternative frequency and
distribute new equipment that uses the alternativ@
frequency.
Under a SCA, yet another opportunity arises. 193 The
owner of the technology can approach the manager of the
SCA, and suggest that she might be interested in acquiring
an exclusive right to utilize this frequency. The SCA
manager will then investigate the costs of moving other
users of this commons frequency to another frequency.
These costs include both the costs of acquiring other
spectrum frequencies to use as commons for these users,
and the costs of developing and distributing new equipment
for these individual users. 194 The owner of the technology
could then determine whether this option would be the best
response to the interference problem. If so, the owner would
pay the required compensation to the manager of the SCA,
and would acquire an exclusive right to use this frequency.
As long as this new technology is valuable enough to make
this transfer feasible, the net result of this flexibility is the
opportunity to properly respond to the problem of
interference suffered by a valuable technology that utilizes
a commons frequency. Why would this be necessary? The
answer lies with risk and how technological development
occurs. Most of the time, technological development is not a
completely foreseeable activity. Promising technologies may
go nowhere, and seemingly pedantic technologies may be
runaway hits. 195 As a result, the planning and financing
process is never completely clear.
192. See supra Part VI.B.
193. It is important to recognize that the other two reactions are also
possible under a SCA. Economic theory suggests that owners of technologies
hindered by interference will choose the reaction that has the lowest total cost
(which could include the costs of impaired transmissions as different
frequencies are used than under the original design).
194. These costs also could include estimated costs of compensating users
for impaired transmissions as different frequencies are used.
195. One example frequently cited is the triumph of the VHS technology
over the Betamax technology for video tape recording.
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Furthermore, technological development frequently
occurs in stages. For example, multiple editions of software
are frequently released. 196 While each of these stages may
not be a revolutionary change, 197 each evolutionary stage
requires considerable amounts of investment to be
successful. Because of the uncertainty and risk involved, it
may be impossible to foresee whether this investment will
be a good one. It is therefore unlikely that a risky
investment by an innovator with no financial backing would
secure financing for secondary and tertiary development
stages before implementing the primary stage.
So what does this mean for an SCA? What this suggests
is that there is a possibility that one of the many innovators
developing a new technology that utilizes a commons
frequency may develop an extremely valuable technology. It
is unlikely that the true value of this technology could be
ascertained prior to implementation. Could the innovator
attract additional financing to refine this technology?
Let's consider a technology sensitive to interference. If
the innovator could alter the frequency used by the
technology, then the innovator could acquire a frequency
operating under an exclusive license. The innovator could,
therefore, solve the interference problem by switching the
frequency used. With this problem solved, the innovator
would more likely attract financing.
However, if design and usability standards required the
continued use of the same frequency, it is unlikely under a
commons approach that the innovator would attract the
needed financing. This is because it is unlikely that the
innovator would be able to convince all users of the
commons frequency to yield exclusive control.
On the other hand, the SCA provides another option for
the innovator. If the innovator can comply with the
required terms set by the SCA manager, 198 the innovator
196. For example, the previous family of Windows (the current family,
Windows XP is based on the NT kernel) was released as Windows 1.0, 2.0, 3.0,
3.1, 3.11 Workgroup Edition, 95, 98, 98 Second Edition, and Millenium Edition.
197. For

the

difference

between

revolutionary

and

evolutionary

technological change, see CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES
191-96 (1999).

198. In essence, this is like the liability rule option under the CalabresiMelamed framework. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
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can gain exclusive control over the frequency. With
exclusive control, this technology becomes more attractive
for financing additional refinements.
Consequently, the flexibility offered under an SCA will
provide a stronger incentive to develop1 99 more valuable
technologies. Meanwhile, portions of spectrum would
always be available as commons to enable those wishing to
experiment with a new technology the opportunity to do so.
The SCA can therefore serve to alleviate some of the
detrimental effects of a property-rights-trading system,
while enabling the market for spectrum rights to operate,
thereby providing the efficiency advantages of this system
along with incentives to invest in improving the value of
rights to use spectrum.
CONCLUSION

In examining the debate over whether the appropriate
property system for spectrum should be based on a property
rights approach or a commons approach, we should also
consider the transitions these property systems may
undergo as they respond to changes in conditions or
internal contradictions. Looking at the future is an
inherently difficult task, and so this Article instead looks to
the past-in particular, to our prior experience with water
law-to learn more about a possible future for spectrum.
This Article examines a number of strong similarities
between water resources and doctrines, and spectrum
resources and doctrines, to establish the relevance of our
past with water as a guide to the future of spectrum.
The lessons we draw from water law suggest the
following irony: the transitions that property systems,
based either on a property rights approach or a commons
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 1089, 1106-10 (1972). What is essential under both this situation and
under the liability rule is that an external source sets the terms of the bargain
rather than the parties themselves. When the parties are responsible for setting
the terms, as under the property rule option, hold-outs can result. Under the
Calabresi-Melamed framework, the external source is the court, while here, it is
the SCA manager.
199. Also important is the incentive to make additional investments in
refining a technology using a commons frequency. An initial success may
therefore spur additional investment in improving the technology.
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approach, may undertake could leave these systems looking
fairly similar to our current property system for spectrum:
FCC regulation. Just as we have seen in the limited
development of water markets under prior appropriation,
the need to protect third-party interests from transfers of
spectrum property rights could lead to procedural mechanisms that could effectively quash many of these spectrum
trades before they occur. Furthermore, just as we have seen
riparian doctrine states respond to new scarcity in water
resources by transitioning to a regulated riparian system,
we could also expect that a commons-based property system
for spectrum would also respond to an inevitable scarcity in
spectrum by transitioning to a regulated commons system.
Thus, regardless of whether we choose to adopt a
system for spectrum based on property rights, or one based
on commons, future transitions to these systems could leave
us back where we started: a property system similar to FCC
regulation, with all of its associated problems. The following
table summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of
property rights and commons approaches for spectrum, and
the transitional pressures and outcomes that may result
from the use of these approaches:
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Table 2. Advantages, Disadvantages, & Transitions for Property
Rights and Commons in Spectrum.

Property
System

Flexibility
inan
Responding
to
Interference
Problems

Provides
Capability
and
Incentives

Transitional

Transitional

Innovate
fote
foth
Following

Pressure

Outcome

Groups

Property
Rights

Can respond
through both
technological
solutions and
market make
mechanisms

Wellfinanced
innovators
expecting
er large
are
very
returns

Possibly
detrimental
effects on third
parts frm
parties
from
frequency
license
transe
transfers

Regulatory
oversight of
frequency
transfers

A wider
range of
innovators,

Commons

Can only
respond
through
technonogirugh
solutions

including
those
without the
financing to
acquire
licenses

Possible
interference
effects on very
valuable use of
commons
frequency

Regulatory
oversight of
commons
frequency

under the
property
right regime I

To find some solution to this conundrum, an alternative
is suggested by our recent experience with Environmental
Water Accounts. While operating in a property-rightstrading-based system, EWAs provide commons benefits for
environmental interests in water bodies. In a similar
manner, this Article proposes the development of SCAs.
Similar to EWAs, SCAs would operate within a propertyrights-trading-based system for spectrum. Through the
SCA, significant portions of the spectrum would be acquired
for use as commons, and also to protect third-party
interests. However, by operating through a baseline market
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system, this property system can use market signals to
respond to scarcities of spectrum, and so the imposition of
regulatory controls would be unnecessary. Thus, a property
system involving an SCA could offer the advantages of both
property rights and commons for spectrum. The following
table summarizes these features of SCAs:
Table 3. Spectrum Commons Accounts Provide Advantages of
Commons and Property Rights, and Respond to Transitional
Pressures.

Property
System

Spectrum
Commons
Accounts

Provides
Capability
and
Incentives
to Innovate
for the
Following
Groups

Flexibility
in
Responding
to
Interference
Problems

Can respond
through both
technological
solutions and
market
mechanisms

A wide range
of innovators,
including
those without
the financing
to acquire
licenses
under the
property right
regime

Transitional
Pressures

Outcome
Utilizing
Flexibility of
SCA (No
Transition
Needed)

Possibly
detrimental
effects on
third parties
from
frequency
license
transfers

SCA manager
will provide
funds for
purchases of
new equipment
and new
spectrum
frequencies
SCA manager

Possible
interference
efece
efc
on
very valuable
commons
commoncy

can negotiate
the purchase of
tha commons
spectrum
frequency by
the owner of a
very valuable
use of that

frequency

frequency

This

Article

has

applications

beyond

water

and

spectrum. SCAs are a form of marketable commons
20 0
property. As a new fourth category of property systems,

200. See supra Table 1.
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marketable commons property enables us to better achieve
our objectives depending on circumstances. Water law
utilizes all four categories: property rights in prior
appropriations doctrine, commons in riparian doctrine,
inherently public in the public trust doctrine, and
marketable commons in Environmental Water Accounts.
Recognizing the possibility of this new category will
provide opportunities to better manage other resources.
Utilizing the marketable commons system will be best
under the following conditions:
(1) organization under a commons approach in most
cases is necessary to achieve the primary objective of
managing the resource;
(2) in rare situations, internal or external conditions
may make the application of the commons approach
extremely costly for a particular participant; and
(3) that participant detrimentally affected could assert
political power that would lead to a transition away from
a pure commons system.
Under these conditions, use of a marketable commons
property system will enable the achievement of the
innovation and distribution advantages offered by the
commons approach. At the same time, the possibility of
having an extremely costly conflict is eliminated by making
the entire system responsive to market signals. Marketable
commons property will thus likely find many applications
beyond water law and the telecommunications spectrum.
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Figure 1. Diagram showing effects on stream flow from diversion and
return flow.
Initial Flow: 100
acre-feet (af)

Flow after return
flow reenters
stream: 70 af

Flow after
diversion: 50 af

LISTEA
Return Flow of
20 af

Consumptive
Use of 30 af

Figure 2. Diagram showing effect of available water to Farm B after
a transfer from Farm A to Factory C. Due to a difference in return
flow, water available to Farm B has reduced from 30af to lOaf.
...............
. .........................................
I Initial Flow : 50 af

Initial Flow : 50 af
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